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ABSTRACT 
GETTING TO THE TABLE PROCESS: 
UNDERLYING CONDITIONS OF THE TURKISH-GREEK CYPRIOT 
RAPPROCHEMENT OF DECEMBER 2001 
ÇİNİ, NİHAN 
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June 2002, viii + 45 pages 
 
 The main purpose of this research is to analyze the factors that led to direct talks 
between Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders, Glafcos Clerides and Rauf Denkdas, in 
December 2001, which can be seen as a new hope for the solution of a thirty eight-year 
conflict. This project is interested in knowing if the changes in different structural, 
domestic and international levels had an influence in the Turkish and Greek Cypriot 
leaders’ attitudes toward the Cyprus conflict. Concentrating on these factors enables an 
understanding of the dynamics of getting to the table process. This project tries to bring 
a detailed knowledge on the factors affecting parties to get to the table for direct talks 
by using the Cyprus conflict as the case. Based on the literature review different sub-
categories are developed to have a comprehensive picture of getting to the table process 
in Cyprus. The variables; domestic, international and structural; are made by combining 
theoretical frameworks. The aim of this research is to find whether the factors had an 
effect on the conflicting parties in their decision to start bi-communal talks. This study 
will further elaborate on the nature of this influence. After examining all the factors, one 
can conclude that four factors affected both conflicting parties' decisions to start 
negotiations: change in domestic politics, increasing political opposition, change in 
international politics and third parties’ initiatives/pressures. Seven factors which 
affected the Turkish side’s decision to start negotiations are: change in domestic 
politics, increasing political opposition, domestic pressure, change in international 
environment, third parties initiatives or pressures, hurting stalemate, and deadline. From 
this analysis, one can conclude that the Turkish Cypriots have more reasons to start 
direct talks than do the Greek Cypriots.  
 
 
Keywords: getting to the table process, the Cyprus conflict, domestic, structural and 
international factors, direction of the effect of factors  
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Bu araştırmanın esas amacı Aralık 2001’de gerçekleşen ve otuzsekiz yıldır süregelen 
Kıbrıs sorununa çözüm umudu olarak görülen Klerides-Denkdaş doğrudan 
görüşmelerini ortaya çıkaran faktörleri analiz etmektir. Bu proje yerel, uluslararası ve 
yapısal değişimlerin, Kıbrıs Türk ve Kıbrıs Rum liderlerinin Kıbrıs sorununa 
yaklaşımlarına etkisini incelemektedir. Bu faktörler üzerinde yoğunlaşmak müzakere 
masasına oturma sürecindeki dinamiklerin anlaşılmasını mümkün kılar. Proje, Kıbrıs 
sorununu örnek alarak tarafların yüzyüze görüşme için müzakere masasına oturma 
sürecini etkileyen faktörleri ayrıntılı olarak ele almaktadır. Kıbrıs’ta masaya oturma 
sürecini kapsamlı  bir biçimde sunmak için farklı alt başlıklar literatüre dayanarak 
geliştirilmiştir. Birleştirilen kuramsal çerçeveler yerel, uluslararası ve yapısal 
değişkenleri oluşturmaktadırlar.  Bu araştırmanın amacı incelenen faktörlerin çatışan 
tarafların toplumlararası görüşmelere başlama kararı almalarındaki etkisini bulmaktır. 
Bu çalışma bahsedilen etkinin doğasını derinlemesine inceleyecektir. Tüm bu faktörleri 
ele aldıktan sonra, çatışan tarafların görüşmeleri başlatmasında dört faktörün etkili 
olduğu söylenebilir: iç politikada değişimler, artan siyasi muhalefet, uluslararası 
politikadaki değişimler ve üçüncül tarafların girişimleri ya da baskıları. Kıbrıs Türk 
tarafının görüşmelere başlamasını sağlayan yedi faktör; iç politika değişimi, artan siyasi 
muhalefet, toplumsal baskı, uluslararası ortamdaki değişimler, üçüncül tarafların 
girişim/baskıları, Türk ve Rum taraflarının çatışmaya devam etmeleri halinde daha fazla 
zarar uğrayacağını farketmeleri ve zaman kısıtlamasıdır. Bu analizden yola çıkarak 
Kıbrıs Türkleri’nin yüzyüze görüşmeleri başlatmak için Kıbrıs Rum tarafından daha 
fazla sebepleri olduğu öne sürülebilir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: müzakereye oturma süreci, Kıbrıs sorunu, yerel, yapısal ve 
uluslararası faktörler, faktörlerin etkilerinin yönü    
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CHAPTER I 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 The aim of this project is to analyze the factors that led to direct talks between 
Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders, Glafcos Clerides and Rauf Denkdas, in December 
2001 direct talks, which can be seen as a new hope for the solution of a thirty eight-year 
conflict. It is important to recall that the Cyprus question is one of the longest 
unresolved conflicts of the world.  In this project I will analyze the effects of different 
factors, which led the parties decide to start direct negotiations after five years of 
deadlock. The main purpose of this research is to discover if changes in different 
structural, domestic and international levels effected in the Turkish and Greek Cypriot 
leaders’ attitudes toward the Cyprus conflict.  
 The Cyprus conflict is a protracted conflict, which has been going on for 
decades. Policy-makers, politicians, scholars and many others have dealt with this 
conflict for years in order to find a solution that would benefit both the Turkish and 
Greek communities. This study analyzes the factors that lead to direct negotiations 
between the two leaders of Cyprus. Concentrating on these factors enables an 
understanding of the dynamics of getting to the table process. It is anticipated that this 
research will provide policy implications for other deep-rooted, long-standing conflicts.  
Many theories explain the processes of getting to the table; many are about the failures 
and successes of negotiations and mediations. This paper’s intention is not to evaluate 
the results of the negotiation; instead this paper proposes to investigate the dynamics 
that helped parties to decide to get to the table, which is one of the most important steps 
in the negotiation process. This project tries to bring a detailed knowledge on the factors 
affecting parties to get to the table for direct talks by using the Cyprus conflict as the 
case.  
 
1.1 Literature Review:  
The theoretical literature review presented below provides the basis for the 
conceptual framework for the analysis of the factors that led disputed sides to start 
direct negotiation to solve a prolonged conflict. 
Carpenter and Kennedy discuss some of the people problems, which can arise in 
the negotiation process, and suggest ways of dealing with such problems.1 According to 
the theoreticians, convincing parties to agree negotiation may present problems. There 
are a number of reasons why parties may be reluctant to enter negotiations. Agreeing to 
negotiate may appear as a sign of weakness. Parties may be deeply distrustful of each 
other. A party may believe that it can get its way in the dispute by other means. The 
negotiation process might seem strange or risky, or other options for settling the dispute 
may appear preferable.  
The key is to convince the parties that negotiation offers the greatest potential 
benefits, and that the costs of pursuing the other options or continuing the conflict are 
too high.2  
Rubin says that although the concepts of "timing" and "ripeness" are crucial to 
the successful de-escalation of international conflicts, these concepts are sometimes 
dismissed by social scientists because of their highly subjective nature.3 He defines 
timing as the importance of doing things in one sequence or at one time rather than 
another. He defines ripeness as "the right time" to do something.4  
    In some kinds of conflicts, conflicting parties find creative ways to increase the 
size of the “pieces of pie” to create ripeness. Not all conflicts lend themselves to this 
type of solution; however, finding new pies or larger pieces of pie is sometimes difficult 
to do without the assistance of a third party. In some cases, these pieces of pie take the 
form of tangible objects such as land or natural resources. In other cases, these pieces of 
pie assume form of intangibles such as proposals which reframe the conflict in a way 
that allows one or both sides to give up highly-publicized, fixed positions via the 
introduction of face-saving "decommiting formulas."5  
                                                          
1 L. S. Carpenter and W. J. D. Kennedy, Managing Public Disputes (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1988), 
pp. 224-257).  
2 Ibid, pp: 224-257 
3 Z. J. Rubin, “The Timing of Ripeness and The Ripeness of Timing,” in L. Kriesberg and S. J. Thorson, 
eds. (New York: Syracuse Univ. Press, 1991), pp. 237-246.  
4 Ibid, pp. 237-246. 
5 Ibid, pp. 237-246. 
 In current literature Four different “ripe moment” thesis exist in current 
literature. The following text is heavily based on Mitchell’s work, Cutting Losses: 
Reflections on Appropriate Timing.6  Zartman pioneers two of the “ripe moment” 
theses, four of which are:  
• The Hurtling Stalemate suggested by Zartman and developed by Stedman and 
Haass. 
• The Imminent Mutual Catastrophe originated by Zartman. 
• The Entrapment (ENT) model introduced by Edmead, Teger, and others. 
• The Enticing Opportunity (ENO) model suggested by Mitchell and Crocker.7  
 
The Hurting Stalemate Model  
Zartman’s original theory argues that a negotiated solution is most likely to be 
considered by the adversaries when: 
 “They anticipate a long period continually costly action, 
together with a low perceived probability of achieving their 
goals and a high perceived probability of achieving their 
goals and a high perceived probability of a looming disaster 
that would increase still further the costs of continuing 
coercive strategies.”8  
  
The main argument of the Hurtling Stalemate model (HS) is that the conflicting 
sides mostly seek a negotiated solution, when no successful outcome from the current 
situation has been envisioned. Also the will to end the increasing painful costs helps to 
decide on negotiation.  
 According to Zartman, extended pain is the most effective factor that shows the 
people future costs, alternatives, and options. The leaders, according to him, after 
recognizing the pain of loss, change their minds and seek other alternative solutions. It 
is the stalemate that hurts that changes the minds of disputant leaders. The HS model 
represents the “plateau” aspect of Zartman’s model. 
Two Stages for “Ripeness”9 
Latency            Prosecution           Crisis            Violence              Stalemate 
CM                                                                                                    CR  
                                                          
6 C. R. Mitchell, “Cutting Losses: Reflections On Appropriate Timing,” Working Paper 9. (Virginia: 
ICAR, 1996), p.1  
7 ibid, pp. 2-3  
8 ibid, p.2  
9 ibid, p.9 
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The Imminent Mutual Catastrophe 
  The Imminent Mutual Catastrophe model is that when parties meet with major 
catastrophes, they consider conditions ripe for de-escalation and conflict resolution. An 
undeniable disaster, a huge increase in costs, and a major drop in the perceived 
probability of success and victory through the struggle are main features of successful 
de-escalation situation. However, in order to decide on a negotiated settlement, both 
sides have to face such a catastrophe; otherwise no one has any incentives to look for a 
settlement.10  
The Entrapment Model 
 This model can be seen as a direct rival to the Hurting Stalemate model and 
introduced by Edmead and Teger. According to this model, the leaders are trapped into 
a continued conflict situation that victory should be achieved. As the costs increase, the 
reason to continue also strengthens. Here to be hurt is the reason to carry on the conflict 
to justify the sacrifices that have already been made.  
“Costs become transformed into investments in a victory that 
must be complete.”11  
 
For the justification of the psychological and political sacrifices, parties feel the 
need to continue the conflict.  
 In the Entrapment model, third parties can play a much more active role to bring 
the ripe moment into the scene rather than sit and wait parties to recognize it. There are 
some questions that third parties should ask how they might best help: 
• The adversaries to anticipate likely future costs? 
• Leaders to develop viable options? 
• Free leaders from constraints on their ability to search for alternative solutions? 
• How might we best describe a non-threatening and non-coercive process that will 
assist leaders in developing a conciliatory mentality and in moving towards a 
solution?12  
                                                          
10 ibid, p.3 
11 ibid, p.4 
12 ibid, p.9 
The Enticing Opportunity Model 
 This is a more optimistic model when compared with the first three models and 
originally founded by C. Mitchell and Crocker. This model explains that the leaders 
choose negotiated outcomes when they recognize a better way to achieve their goals 
other than to continue the conflicting situation. Crocker mentions:  
“New options open up or are created which cost less and offer more likely gains than 
continued violence and mutual coercion.”13  
This model brings into a wide variety of possible factors. Crocker mentioned 
variable factors as: 
• availability and increasing acceptability of some new sets of basic ideas, principles 
and concepts 
• gradual blocking or disappearance of parties’ unilateral options 
• existence of useful channels through which adversaries can communicate 
• existence of some areas in which “informality can thrive, and, ultimately, new 
principles can be converted into precise agreements.14  
According to Crocker, third parties play a significant role in the creation of those 
situations and ripe moments: 
 “Others have echoed Crocker, suggesting that the right set 
of circumstances may result from the advent of new 
leadership not as committed to the goals or methods of 
their predecessors, a change of goals or level of 
commitment on the part of the adversaries’ patrons, the 
availability of new resources from which to construct an 
innovative solution and/or change of priorities within one 
or both adversaries.”15  
 
In Mitchell’s work “Conflict Resolution and Civil War,” a number of factors 
seem to have contributed to an appropriate set of circumstances that encourages 
settlement in Sudanese Civil War, were mentioned. These factors can be divided in 
three categories: The relevant terms offered by the adversaries (interparty); the level of 
cohesion within each party (intraparty); and the vulnerability of external patrons to 
pressure either forms one of the adversaries or from third parties.16  
                                                          
13 ibid, p.9 
14 ibid, p.6 
15 ibid, p.7 
16 ibid, p.7 
To influence adversaries to think of moving towards a negotiated settlement, 
however, the principal deciding condition appears to be that leaders on both sides see 
that major rewards may be achieved through the pursuit of some negotiated solution. 
Future leadership role and a share in political power can be some of the rewards that 
convince leaders to start negotiations.17  
“It is the appearance of an opportunity perceived as sufficiently 
enticing that provides, in the eyes of key decision-makers, the 
ripe moment. Perceptions and evaluations of the changing nature 
of costs and damage determine the point at which leaders will 
contemplate cutting losses and seeking a negotiated 
settlement.”18  
 
Marieke Kleiboer suggests that the main attention should be paid to the will of 
adversaries, internal factors and leaders themselves for negotiated settlements.19 
According to Kleiboer the important key questions are the degree to which structural 
and systemic conditions influence willingness and what might be done by third parties 
and the adversaries themselves to bring about conditions that she called as “complete 
willingness” to seek a solution. She believes that political aspects play an important role 
such as the perceptions, authority, and leverage of leaders of conflicting parties.20 
According to D. Lieberfeld, certain indicators may be useful leading adversaries 
to the negotiated settlement: 21 
• Acknowledgment of stalemate, with each side credibly able to claim to be 
negotiating from a position of strength; 
• Centrality in national-level political competition of the debate over negotiated 
settlement; 
• Leadership change on the side defending the status quo; 
• Failed attempts to cultivate alternative negotiation partners; 
• Unofficial contacts between politically influential constituents of officials from both 
sides; 
• Declarations by each side’s leadership specifying non-maximalist preconditions for 
negotiation; and 
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• Stable negotiated settlements in related conflicts.22  
In the article “Getting to Why”, Michael Watkins writes about a typology of action-
forcing events whose main features are: 23 
• Exogenous or endogenous: Outside circumstances can impose action-forcing events 
or negotiators’ actions can give way to action-forcing event. 
• Unilateral or consensual: Negotiators may take unilateral actions, such as a threat 
tied to a deadline that force action by their counterparts. But negotiators may also 
agree to be mutually bound by a commitment to a deadline  
• Employed by both negotiators and inventors 
• Not limited to deadlines24  
Janice G. Stein similarly examines the factors affecting the process of getting to the 
table.25 According to Stein, a recent or expected crisis or a paired perception of threat 
and opportunity was one of the significant catalysts of getting to the table process. The 
threat of a recent or an expected crisis leads policy-makers to consider negotiation as an 
alternative option. Leaders can recognize the advantage of co-operative solutions, which 
help the leaders to see the problem from a different perspective.26  
The benefits of negotiations can attract leaders to consider negotiation as an option. 
Stein mentions that “ the leaders have decided to consider negotiation when they see:  
• the need for a strategy of crisis avoidance or post-crisis management or  
• a conjunction of threat and opportunity,  
• pre-negotiation promises to reduce some of the risks associated with negotiation,  
• they anticipate benefits from the process which are largely independent of whether 
or not it culminates in agreement.”27  
Stein explains that without making the analysis of the getting to the table process, 
one cannot speak about the shape of the table, who gets and who does not, what is on 
the table and what is kept off. She mentions the importance of the domestic politics and 
continues that each party tries to convince their domestic constituencies and build 
support for an expected agreement. In conclusion, she sums up what she had found: 
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• the parties see the status quo unacceptable 
• they anticipate high costs and crisis 
• parties seek to avoid crisis 
• they aim to change the direction of relationship that helps the adversaries to be 
better off. 
As the above review suggests, different scholars mention different factors that 
would lead parties to start negotiations. Below is a framework, which can be used to 
investigate the effects of different variables in explaining the recent rapprochement in 
Cyprus conflict. Based on the above literature different sub-categories are developed to 
have a comprehensive picture of getting to the table process in Cyprus. That said it 
would not wrong to conclude that at least three broad categories exist in understanding 
changes in attitudes and behaviours of leaders. They are structural, domestic and 
international factors. The framework that will be used in the analysis section is the 
following:  
Domestic Factors: 
• Change in domestic politics 
• Change in leaders 
• Increasing political opposition 
• Domestic pressure to the leaders of communities 
International Factors: 
• Change in international environment 
• Third party initiatives and/or pressure 
Structural Factors:  
• Ripe moment- hurting stalemate 
• The availability and increasing acceptability of some new sets of basic ideas, 
principles and concepts 
• The existence of useful channels through which adversaries can 
communicate 
• An undeniable disaster, a huge increase in costs, and a major drop in the 
perceived possibility of success     
• Deadline  
• Complete willingness 
The above lists of variables are made by combining theoretical frameworks, which 
have been reviewed. The aim of this research is to find whether these factors had an 
effect on the conflicting parties in their decision to start bi-communal talks. The study 
will further elaborate on the nature of this influence. 
Cyprus case is one of the oldest crises that have many different dynamics. Many 
people have been working on this crisis for years to find a solution that would benefit 
both parties. In the next chapter presents the background of the Cyprus problem.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 The Cyprus Problem 
 
2.1 The Background of the Conflict 
  
A small island in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea with a landmass of 
9250 square kilometres, Cyprus is the third largest island in the Mediterranean with a 
past stretching back to pre-history and rich deposits of copper ore and its close 
proximity to Syria, Egypt and Anatolia has given Cyprus a strategic and economic 
importance from its earliest history. Cyprus came in turn under the control of the 
Egyptians, the Assyrians, and the Romans.28 
 In 1571 Cyprus became part of the Ottoman Empire with Turkish settlers 
coming from South-Eastern and Western Anatolia. At the end of the 19th century 
Cyprus was leased to the British with the proviso that sovereignty remained with the 
Ottoman Empire. At the end of WWI the British annexed the island.29  
 In 1925 Greek Cypriots, who supported Enosis (union with Greece), started their 
first violent attacks against the British. This rebellion continued until the end of WWII. 
The British had faced hard times during those attacks. Most Greeks seemed to have 
accepted that the British rule over the island should end. In 1950s the voices of Greeks 
who demanded union with Greece (ENOSIS), became vocal, organized, and numerous. 
They were able to establish a paramilitary organization called EOKA to serve their 
purpose. On the 1st April 1955 the EOKA started a campaign with the support of Greece 
and engaged in a bitter struggle with the British administration of the island to end the 
British rule and establish Enosis (union with Greece) with mainland Greece.30  
Kalaycioglu mentions how Greek nationalist Cypriots saw the Turkish Cypriotic 
community as: 
“a nuisance for the Greek nationalists and their paramilitary 
organization, the EOKA. It seemed that the Turkish community 
was forced to choose one of the two options: They were either 
accepted to live as a Muslim minority under the Greek rule, or 
ship out of the island. Most Turkish Cypriots preferred to stay, 
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but not as a Muslim minority under the Greek rule, but as a 
community of Turks, enjoying their separate autonomy.”31   
 
The EOKA organization began to attack the Turkish community in all parts of 
the island. The Turkish community started to organize themselves to form self-
protection units but were not successful because they were disorganized and had no 
weapons.  
 From 1955 to 1960 the Greek Cypriot EOKA organization, under the leadership 
of George Grivas, fought for ENOSIS; not for independence.  During the conflict 
hundreds of British people, Turkish Cypriots, and Greek Cypriots were murdered, and 
thousands of Turkish Cypriots fled from mixed villages where their homes had been 
destroyed. In 1960 Britain gave up Cyprus to the two communities, Turkish and Greek 
Cypriots, but kept the two bases, Akrotiri and Dhekelia, under British sovereignty.32  
 The British decision to leave the island paved the way to long diplomatic 
negotiations between the three major parties of the conflict: Britain, Greece, and 
Turkey. The parties to the conflict participated in signing the Accords of Zurich and 
London in 1959 and 1960 for the establishment of an independent republic of Cyprus in 
which both communities would share the public offices, which they would elect 
representatives through popular vote. Britain, Greece and Turkey were placed as 
guarantors of the domestic regime and awarded international status as the Republic of 
Cyprus.33 
 In 1960, Cyprus was announced as an independent republic. Archbishop 
Makarios and Dr. Fazil Kucuk became the President and the Vice-President of the 
Republic, who were elected by each community separately. According to the 1960 
Constitution, the President was to be a Greek Cypriot and the Vice-President a Turkish 
Cypriot. Legislative authority was vested in a House of Representatives, of whom 70% 
were to be Greek Cypriots and 30% Turkish Cypriots, but legislation and executive 
action required the concurrence of both the President and Vice-President on specified 
matters, including in particular foreign affairs. This bi-communal constitution included 
veto powers for each community.34   
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 The Cyprus problem may be said to have began after 1960 though friction 
between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots was evident earlier, especially when 
Turks aided the British in the 1950s in their quite successful struggle against the EOKA 
organization.35 The 1960 Constitution did not last very long; it survived only 3 years. 
The constitution became unworkable because the Greek Cypriot leadership refused to 
fulfil the agreed on obligations. EOKA once again started its campaign, and two 
mosques were bombed on the 25th March 1962.  On the 21st December EOKA terrorists 
started an armed campaign. This became known as “Bloody Christmas” and large 
members of Turkish Cypriots were killed.36 The Greek Cypriots launched their plan, 
Akritas, aimed to unite with Greece and if Turkish community resisted, exterminating 
the Turkish Cypriots from the island. President Makarios wanted to amend the thirteen 
points of the 1960 Constitution. These were about the rights of the Turkish Cypriots. 
The aim was to reduce the Turkish Cypriot people to the status of minority. The Turkish 
Cypriots did not accept Constitutional change. They were ejected by force of arms and 
the bi-communal character of the Republic was destroyed. The Turkish Cypriots were 
squeezed into 3% of the island’s territory after the events of 1963.37  
The island was divided into two by a line, called the “Green Line”. The UN 
Security Council with Resolution 186 sent UN Peacekeeping Forces to Cyprus in 1964 
and its mandate has been extended every six months since then.38    
An important event took place in 1964 when President Lyndon Johnson 
delivered blunt warning to Ismet Inonu, the Turkish Prime Minister not to intervene in 
Cyprus where the Turkish Cypriots were subject to continual harassment and attack. He 
told the Turkish government that if it intervened and the Soviet Union became involved, 
NATO allies’ would not have had a chance to consider whether they had an obligation 
to protect Turkey. The Turks were prevented from intervention but later used planes to 
attack effectively Greek Cypriot positions.39 
When the militantly nationalistic Greek junta overthrew Makarios in July 1974, 
it became obvious that the Turkish community was at risk and the EOKA-led coup was 
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enjoying full support of the Greek government. The Turkish government tried to 
convince the British government to restore the previous status of the Republic of 
Cyprus, but no agreement was reached between the two governments. Turkey was 
alarmed by the seizure of power in Cyprus by Nicos Sampson, with Greek military 
backing. The Turkish aim was two-fold: to stop Cyprus becoming a Greek island, and to 
protect the Turkish Cypriots. Turkey intervened as a guarantor power on 20 July 1974 
in conformity with its treaty rights and obligations. The Turkish intervention blocked 
the way to the annexation of the island by Greece.40  
  The West at first welcomed the intervention; a cease-fire was arranged. The 
Sampson government fell, as did the military junta in Athens. Claiming that Turkish 
Cypriots were still being kept as hostages by Greek Cypriot forces, the Turkish 
government demanded that the Greek Cypriots accepted immediately a plan for six 
Turkish Cypriot cantons. This demand for immediate acceptance scandalized the 
Western powers, but did not stop Turkey from extending her control to some 36% of the 
island.41 
The intervention affected Turkey’s relations with the United States and Britain. 
It partitioned the island. Some 140-160,000 Greek Cypriots fled to the South, and about 
50,000 Turkish Cypriots moved to the North. This has become the traumatic event in 
the history for the Greek Cypriots. This event marks for them the real beginning of the 
Cyprus problem.42  
After the intervention, in 1975 Turkish Cypriots constituted Turkish Federated 
State of Cyprus. The title suggested it was to join in a federation with the state in the 
South. The state was equipped with a liberal and democratic constitution and was 
approved by referendum. However, the Security Council regretted this move for the 
European Commission of Human Rights declined to recognize the new state.43  
In 1983 the Turkish Cypriots declared their independence on the principle of 
self-determination. They established themselves as the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus on 15th November 1983. The UN Security Council declared “the purported 
secession… legally invalid.” (Resolution No. 541, 1983) Britain submitted the draft 
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resolution. The UN continued to support the Greek Cypriot embargo on the new nation-
state.44 
 
2.2 Conflict Resolution Attempts: A Brief History 
Until now, the Cyprus problem is explained. In this project, it is important to 
know the problem in order to understand the difficulty of getting parties to the table. 
Since the 1960s, there have been many negotiation attempts and parties could not reach 
a common solution. In most cases one side rejected to come to the table or left the table 
during negotiations. The last negotiation attempt started in December 2001 still 
continues. A brief historical background of negotiation attempts that prepared a ground 
for the last initiative is useful at this point in this paper.     
The first intercommunal negotiations between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek 
Cypriots began in 1968 under the auspices of the Special Representative of the UN 
Secretary-General. The aim was to revise the 1960 Constitution. Until 1974, the Greek 
coup d’etat, the talks continued. After 1974, the scope of the negotiations changed and 
search for a ‘federal’ solution was attempted. However, both sides had different views 
about a ‘federal’ solution. In April 1975 the talks started again. The first round of talks 
was held in Vienna from 28 April to 3 May; the second round between 5 to 7 June; and 
the third round between 31 July to 2 August; and the forth round in New York from 8 to 
10 September 1975. The population exchange on both sides of the island was accepted 
in the third round. This is the first time that the island was divided into two distinct 
‘ethnic zones.’ 45 
 
i. 1977-1979 Agreements 
  The period between 1977-1979 was the high-level agreements. On 27 January 
1977 a meeting was held in Nicosia between Rauf Denkdas, President of the Turkish 
Federated State of Cyprus and Archbishop Makarios, the President of the Greek 
Cypriots. Denkdas and Makarios adopted four important guidelines: 
       The creation of an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal federal republic; 
The territory under the administration of each community star be discussed in the light 
of economic viability or productivity and land ownership; Discussion of freedom of 
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movement, freedom of settlement, and right to own property; The powers of the central 
government to be such as to safeguard the unity of the country, having regard to the bi-
communal nature of the state.  
Following this negotiation, the two leaders agreed upon beginning inter-
communal talks in Vienna on 31 March 1977 until 7 April 1977. This agreement was 
the most important of this period and opened the way for future negotiations although 
the Greek side soon came to think that Makarios had made too many concessions. The 
basis of the Turkish Cypriot proposal was a partnership in power between two equal 
political entities that would join their resources in a central federal administration on a 
basis of equality. The Greek Cypriot side also proposed a federal solution: the basic 
principles of the federal republic, which consisted of a list of powers for the federal 
government and for regional administration. The most important difference between the 
two proposals was that the Greek Cypriot side aimed to preserve the sovereignty, 
independence, and territorial integrity of the “Republic of Cyprus”. They wanted to 
establish a strong central government almost a united state structure.46  
The second meeting between Mr. Denktas and Mr. Kyprianou on 18 and 19 May 
1979 in Nicosia broke the deadlock which arose from the Greek Cypriots’ rejection of 
the Turkish Cypriots’ proposal.  These talks were held under the auspices of the UN 
Secretary-General, Dr. Kurt Waldheim.47 
 
ii. 1984-1986 Draft Framework Agreement 
            Between 1980-1983 the Turkish and Greek Cypriots continued to negotiate. In 
1981 Mr. Hugo Gabi, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General produced 
an evaluation paper known as the ‘Interim Agreement.’ However, the talks between Mr. 
Denkdas and Mr. Kyprianou failed due to the Kyprianou’s refusal to accept Denkdas as 
an equal. This failure accelerated the declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus as an independent state.48  
 By 1984, three rounds proximity talks started under the auspices of UN 
Secretary-General Mr. Perez de Cuellar on 10 September 1984.  
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The purpose was to overcome the difficulty arising from the then Greek Cypriot leader, 
Mr. Kyprianou’s objection to negotiate with the TRNC unless the declaration of 
statehood was withdrawn, and to prepare the ground for direct talks. The first round 
ended on 20 September 1984 without any apparent progress. The UN Secretary-General 
described the talks as “thorough and businesslike”. The Turkish Cypriot side expressed 
its own optimism and satisfaction whereas the Greek Cypriot side expressed its 
pessimism and dissatisfaction about the first round.49  
 
 The second round started on 15 October 1984. On October 16 the UN Secretary-
General presented to both sides an “Agenda for the Second Round of Proximity Talks” 
which laid down principles to be agreed upon by the two sides. The second round ended 
on 26 October without essential progress. However, all sides agreed to hold a third and 
final round of proximity talks on 26 November 1984.50 
The third round began on 26 November 1984 under the auspices of the UN 
Secretary-General. A preliminary draft for a joint high-level agreement was submitted 
to both sides. After discussing the introductory draft, the Turkish Cypriot side declared 
that it fully agreed with all points of the draft while the Greek Cypriot side did not make 
such a declaration.51 
On 17 January 1985 the two leaders, Mr. Denktas and Mr. Kyprianou, came 
together in New York for the summit meeting. Despite the efforts of the Secretary-
General, the two leaders did not agree on a joint communique. The Secretary-General 
stated that: 
  The Turkish Cypriot side “fully accepts the draft agreement” while the Greek 
Cypriot side accepted it “as a basis for a negotiation in accordance with the integrated 
whole approach aiming at a comprehensive and overall solution to the Cyprus problem. 
The summit ended on 20 January 1985 without a framework laying down the principles 
for a federal solution being agreed upon.52 
 
The UN Secretary-General prepared a “Draft Framework Agreement” on the 
basis of discussion with both sides. The agreement proposed procedures for negotiation 
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of the outstanding issues which remained to be brought to the ground, including 
withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces, guarantees, and the three freedoms (freedom of 
movement, freedom of settlement and the right to property). Perez de Cuellar presented 
the “Draft Framework Agreement” on 29 March 1986 to both sides for consideration. 
Once again, the Turkish Cypriot side accepted and the Greek Cypriot side rejected the 
draft because of the “negative points”. Therefore, yet another chance of finding a lasting 
solution to the Cyprus problem disappeared due to the intransigence of the Greek 
Cypriot side.53  
 
iii. 1992 Set of Ideas 
 In June 1992 the leaders of the both communities were invited by the UN 
Secretary-General, Mr Boutros-Boutros Ghali to discuss a ‘Set of Ideas’ for an overall 
framework agreement on Cyprus. The Set of Ideas was the most detailed plan composed 
of 100 paragraphs and a map. The two leaders, President Denkdas and President 
Vassiliou, after negotiating with the UN Secretary-General separately, agreed to come 
together in August in a meeting that would be focused on territorial adjustments and 
displaced persons. At the end of the talks Turkish Cypriot side accepted 91 of 100 
paragraphs but rejected the map as a basis for reaching an agreement. On the other 
hand, the Greek Cypriots accepted the Set of Ideas and the map as a basis for reaching 
an agreement, subject to negotiation. The talks were postponed to be begun in March 
1993, since the basic differences between the two sides’ positions remained.54  
 
iv. Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) 
After the collapse of the ‘Set of Ideas’ initiative, the UN sought to promote 
measures to build confidence between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The fourteen 
Confidence Building Measures in the proposals (July 1993) include co-operation on 
water problems, meeting of political party leaders, the development of the joint 
commercial projects and two that are vital- the settlement of the fenced area of 
Varosha/Maras, and the re-opening of Nicosia International Airport.55 The outcome of 
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the talks on CBMs was that they were highly politicized by both community leaders and 
they failed. 
 
vi. Troutbeck and Glion Direct Talks 
 For almost three years Greek Cypriot Clerides refused to negotiate with the 
Turkish Cypriot side claiming that there was no common ground. The UN Secretary-
General, Mr Kofi Annan, invited the two leaders to face-to-face talks. Thereupon, a 
series of talks were held first in Troutbeck, New York, between 9-12 July 1997 and in 
Glion, Switzerland, between 11-16 August 1997.56  
 1997 Summer raised hopes for the settlement of the enduring Cyprus problem, 
when Glafcos Clerides and Rauf Denkdas, respective leaders of the Republic of Cyprus 
and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, started face-to-face negotiations. 
However, the talks in Troutbeck ended without any substantive progress due to the 
European Commission’s decision, in its “Agenda 2000” report, to commence accession 
negotiations with “Cyprus” in early 1998.57 
 
vii. 1999-2000 Proximity Talks 
After the failure of the Troutbeck and Glion talks in 1997 and after the EU’s 
Luxembourg Summit, foreign diplomats and special representatives for Cyprus of some 
countries and of the UN engaged in shuttle diplomacy between President Denkdas and 
President Clerides, could not succeed in bringing the two leaders together. On 31 
August 1998 President Denkdas declared his “confederation proposal” for the solution 
of the Cyprus question. The US regarded this proposal as “considerable”, whereas the 
Greek Cypriots immediately rejected it .58 
 In June 1999 the UN Security Council passed two resolutions regarding the 
Cyprus issue. Resolution 1250 called upon the two sides in Cyprus to negotiate, without 
any precondition, within the framework of the Secretary-General’s good offices 
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mission. This idea first came up at the meeting of the G-8 countries. Both sides agreed 
to attend proximity talks until they found a ground for direct talks.59  
 The first round of the proximity talks between TRNC President Denkdas and 
Republic of Cyprus leader Clerides was held in New York on 3-14 December 1999 
under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and his Special Advisor for 
Cyprus Alvaro de Soto. The aim of the talks was to prepare a ground for comprehensive 
face-to-face negotiations in reaching a lasting solution in the island. 
 At the talks, the Turkish Cypriot side proposed forming a confederation that 
would create a comprehensive settlement and also safeguard the Greco-Turkish balance 
in Cyprus and over the region. Besides confederation, there were other issues, to 
negotiate. The Greek Cypriot side, on the other hand, insisted on territory issues and 
submitted a map which left only 24% of the land to the Turkish Cypriot side. During the 
New York talks, as it was described by the UN Secretary-General, “the ‘core issues’ 
consisting of security, distribution of powers, exchange of properties, territory and the 
Turkish Cypriot side’s issues of confederation, equal status, security guarantee, the 
lifting of the embargoes and EU membership were discussed.” At the end of the talks in 
New York, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced that the two sides would 
attend a second round of proximity talks in January 2000. Mr Annan described the first 
round, which lasted twelve days, as having seriously addressed a range of issues, which 
divided the sides in Cyprus.60 
 The second round of proximity talks was also held under the auspices of the UN 
Secretary-General and his Special Advisor for Cyprus between 31 January-10 February 
2000 in Geneva. The aim was to prepare the ground for comprehensive negotiations for 
achieving a final solution in Cyprus. During the talks seven core issues namely 
confederation, security, sovereignty, constitution, freedom of settlement, freedom of 
movement and confidence building measures were negotiated. The primary issues of the 
Turkish Cypriot side were confederation and acknowledgment of sovereignty rights in 
the TRNC, whereas the Greek Cypriot side’s primary issues were territory and the map. 
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Nothing was achieved after the second round and a third negotiation round was agreed 
upon.61  
 The UN sponsored the third round of proximity talks. The talks were held in 
Geneva between 5-12 July 2000 and after 12-day break between 24 July and 4 August 
2000. The Turkish Cypriot side put President Denkdas’s confederation proposal on the 
negotiation table. Mr Alvaro de Soto took the proposal into account. At the end of the 
talks, nothing considerable was achieved.  
 As it can be seen from the above, the Cyprus conflict has been a very 
complicated case. For years there have been many negotiation or mediation attempts 
aimed at solving the conflict. Unfortunately, these attempts failed and it has been five 
years now since the failure of the last direct negotiation attempt. In 1997 Denkdas left 
the table refusing to continue negotiations. In January 2002 Denkdas initiated direct 
talks. This paper focuses in knowing the reasons of this new start which looks like a 
major policy shift for both sides. The next chapter analyzes the getting to the table 
process by applying the nine variables of the first chapter. The aim, again, is to 
understand the impact of these factors on the recent developments. This paper is also 
interested in knowing the direction of these impacts meaning whether a factor had a 
positive or negative effect on getting to the table process is within the scope of this 
research. The period between June 2000 and December 2001 when the President 
Denkdas invited Greek President Clerides to direct talks is the main focus of 
concentration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
61 Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense.(2002). “Main 
Negotiations.”  http://www.trncpio.org/ingilizce/ingilizcesayfa.htm 
  
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
Decision To Talk: Analyzing the Process 
 
 
 This chapter aims to discover the factors that led to direct negotiations between 
Turkish and Greek Cypriot leaders. Talks between Cyprus’ divided communities started 
in January 4, 2001 with real hope that the year 2002 would see a resolution to decades 
of conflict and stalemate over the island’s status. Talks, however, have been stalled 
since 1997. UN-mediated proximity talks were under way until 2000 when the Turkish 
Cypriot leader, Rauf Denkdas, walked out. He, then, made a U-turn at the end of 2001, 
requesting face-to-face talks with the Greek Cypriot leader, Glafcos Clerides.62   
 The nine factors of the first chapter are in this chapter observed in the Cyprus 
case. These nine factors are re-presented below in order to follow the steps more easier:  
Domestic Factors: 
• Change in domestic politics 
• Change in leaders 
• Increasing political opposition 
• Domestic pressure 
International Factors: 
• Change in international environment 
• Third party initiatives and/or pressure 
Structural Factors:  
• Ripe moment- hurting stalemate 
• The availability and increasing acceptability of some new sets of basic ideas, 
principles and concepts 
• The existence of useful channels through which adversaries can communicate 
• An undeniable disaster, a huge increase in costs, and a major drop in the 
perceived possibility of success     
• Deadline  
• Complete willingness 
 
3.1 Domestic Factors 
 
i. Change In Political Leadership 
 According to the literature, leadership change generally makes negotiations 
politically feasible. In the case of Cyprus there is no leadership change. Both leaders 
have been engaged in the Cyprus conflict more than fifty years. 
  Glafcos Clerides was born in Nicosia on April 24, 1919. He studied law at 
King’s Collage of the University of London. From 1951 to 1960 he practiced law in 
Cyprus. In 1959 he participated in the London Conference on Cyprus; and he served as 
Minister of Justice during the transitional period, from colonial administration to 
independence. Clerides was elected to the House of Representatives in July 1960, which 
elected him as its first president and held this position until July 1976.  
 In 1968 he was appointed as the representative of the Greek Cypriot side to the 
inter-communal talks. In February 1969 he founded the Unified Party. In May 1976 he 
established the Democratic Rally Party from certain members of the Unified Party, the 
Progressive Front, and the democratic National Party. 
 On February 1993 Clerides was elected as the President of the Republic of 
Cyprus and was re-elected again on February 15, 1998. During the last fifty years he has 
clearly played a significant role in the political life and evolution of Cyprus.63 
 Rauf R. Denkdas was born in Baf (Paphos), Cyprus in 1924.64 He worked as a 
crown prosecutor before independence from Britain. In 1948 he became a member of 
the Consultative Assembly in search of self-government for Cyprus and member of the 
Turkish Affairs Committee. Between 1949-1957 Denkdas was the Chairman of the 
Federation of Turkish Cypriot Association. In 1958, he advised Turkish Government on 
the rights of Turkish Cypriot people during the preparation of Zurich Agreement. Later 
in this year Denkdas became the leader of the Turkish Cypriot Delegation at the London 
Conference. In 1960, he was elected as the President of the Turkish Communal 
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Chamber. After the partnership on the island collapsed, he took up duties as the 
President of the Turkish Communal Chamber and the Vice-President of the Turkish 
Cypriot Administration. Denkdas formed the National Unity Party in 1973. In 1976, he 
was elected as the President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. In 1983 he 
became the first President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. He was later re-
elected in June 1985, April 1990 and April 1995. Like Clerides, Denkdas spent almost 
all his political career representing the Turkish community of Cyprus at home and 
abroad. 
 Both Denkdas and Clerides realize this is their last political hurrah. These 
venerable leaders, one 78, the other 83, have negotiated for more than four decades. 
Neither can see anyone on the horizon to take their place. They have the same aim: 
making the other side accept the formula closest to the formula on the mind of each 
side. In the end, either a solution will be found or the current situation will continue 
with all its negative aspects. They will not be able to meet at the negotiating table again. 
So this time, both leaders is using his final chance.65  
 
ii. Opposition Parties’ Pressures 
Turkish Cypriots: 
 The second important feature in domestic factors is the opposition party’s 
pressures over the government of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Especially for 
the last few years, the voice of the opposition parties can be heard louder than it was the 
past. The leftist parties and especially the Republican Turkish Party criticize the policies 
of Denkdas.  
 The Republican Turkish Party is the oldest party established by the Turkish 
Cypriot community in 1970 with ,its leader Mehmet Ali Talat, was the party founded in 
order to defend democracy, human rights, and inter-communal peace, to oppose the 
reactionary, chauvinist regime which was under the influence of the military 
organizations of that period.66 The Republican Turkish Party believes that there are 
bases for the inter-communal talks and a solution to the Cyprus Problem. According to 
the party’s beliefs, there are bases for negotiations and a realistic solution for a federal 
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Cyprus would be bi-zonal, bi-communal, politically equal, as well as taking into 
consideration the security needs for both communities. The Republican Turkish Party is 
a political party that embraces each and everyone active in the Turkish Cypriot 
community who sees their future in Cyprus and who wants a just and viable, peaceful 
solution in Cyprus. 67  
 Newspapers have been full of news about the opposition of the Republican 
Turkish Party. In “Kıbrıs” Newspaper of January 18th, 2002, Talat stated that they 
would not let the Turkish Cypriot community to be drawn into an uncertainty. Talat 
blamed Denkdas for being aggressive and added that the EU was not something to be 
feared as it has been shown. Talat mentioned that if Denkdas continued his aggressive 
behavior, not only the Turkish Cypriot community but also Turkey would lose too 
much. Talat and Denkdas have continued their conversational diplomacy through the 
press. Talat especially criticizes Denkdas about the EU accession and states that 
Denkdas does not tell everything about the EU to the Turkish Cypriot community. Talat 
continues that Denkdas should explain what he knows about the EU and invited him to 
discuss the situation. 68 To sum up, the increase in political opposition can positively 
effect the direct negotiation decision of President Denkdas.  
 
Greek Cypriot Side: 
 In the Greek Cypriot community the main party of the left, the Progressive Party 
of the Working People (AKEL), has been the most supportive of a settlement based on 
the various ideas put forth by the UN Secretary-General. The smaller socialist party, the 
Unified Democratic Union of Cyprus (EDEK), has opposed to the creation of a 
federation granting autonomy to Turkish Cypriots. EDEK has also opposed the 
continuation of Turkey’s status as a guarantor. The same position is also held by the 
centrist Democratic Party (DEKO) which represents the political core of what has come 
to be known as the rejectionist front over the issue of a federal settlement. So, one can 
say that opposition parties, especially the Progressive Party of the Working People 
(AKEL), in Greek Cypriot side may also affected the decision of Clerides’ acceptance 
of Denkdas’s invitation.69  
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iii. Increasing Domestic Pressure 
 
Greek Cypriot Side 
  Increasing domestic pressure is the third feature mostly related with the 
‘island’s’ economic situation. The economic gap between the north and the south part of 
the island affects domestic pressure.  
 Greek Cypriots have a record of successful economic performance, reflected in 
rapid growth, full employment conditions, and external and internal stability, almost 
entirely throughout the post-independence period. The under-developed economy, 
inherited from the colonial rule in 1960, has been transformed into a modern economy, 
with dynamic services, industrial and agricultural sectors and advanced physical and 
social infrastructure. Cyprus is classified among the high-income countries.70 Although 
domestic pressure of Greek Cypriots might be effective; there is not enough evidence to 
determine the direction of the influence. 
 
Turkish Cypriot Side 
 The poor structural transformation realized in the Turkish Cypriot economy after 
1974 can best be illustrated by the fact that during the period 1975-1990 the economy 
has shown only an average 6.5 per cent growth rate per annum.71 During the same 
period, the mainly agriculture based TRNC economy underwent a major structural 
transformation with the expansion of its industrial and service sectors.  
 Northern Cyprus, due to the pressure from Greece and Greek Cypriots, severely 
limited economic development in the country since its formulation in 1983. The country 
gets little aid or assistance from the United Nations, international tending agencies or 
banks. Northern Cyprus cannot join the World Trade Organization or other global 
economic bodies. The export of agricultural produce to the outside world, especially to 
the European Union has been severely curtailed. As a result, this sector of the economy 
has been in marked decline.72   
 The tourist industry has suffered immensely as well since the TRNC has no 
direct airplane connections with any country other than Turkey nor do cruise ships dock 
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here. Many multinational corporations, fearing Greek retaliation, refuse to openly sell 
goods here.  
 Until Northern Cyprus is in one way or another accepted by the international 
community, the economy, which depends on exclusively on Turkey for support, will 
continue to deteriorate. So there was a widespread welcome from Turkish Cypriots for 
the prospects of more negotiations starting. In “Kibris”, one of the newspapers that are 
published in Northern Cyprus, the big heading was the “Historic Step.” The article went 
on to say that the outcome of the meeting between President Clerides and President 
Denkdash had raised hopes among Turkish Cypriots who have been enduring 
international isolation and economic hardship.73  
 As a result of economic hardship, many Turkish Cypriots have immigrated to 
the Greek side. Unemployment, poverty and lack of hope are the main reasons of 
immigration. They cannot see their future and they envy the Greek side. So the 
economic problems creates domestic pressure on the government of Northern Cyprus.74 
Therefore, one could conclude that domestic pressure has a positive impact on the 
decision of Denkdas to start direct negotiations.     
 
3.2 International Factors: 
 
i. Change In International Environment 
The Post-Cold War Era 
 To see the affects of the international factors one should look at the change in 
international climate, third party initiatives, and/or pressure. After the Cold War, a New 
World system emerged and political changes can be observed easily all over the world. 
 Socialist regimes of the Eastern Europe for example were broken up. The Soviet 
Union collapsed, and the Cold War has finished. The emergence of new states brought 
the idea of nationalism. Ethnic conflicts showed themselves in many places especially 
in the Balkans, in the Middle East and in the Caucuses. Turkey and Greece, located in 
between these areas, have seen the necessity to reconsider their foreign policies. 
According to Bartmann, “the end of Cold War has fundamentally changed the landscape 
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of the international system. The Cyprus issue can be usefully revisited against the 
backdrop of changing international norms and prevailing orthodoxies. Prior to the Cold 
War, the TRNC stood alone as a pariah state subject to international shunning but 
nonetheless defiant, popularly supported and effective in its authority ground. Now 
TRNC is one of nearly a dozen de facto unrecognized states that by their stubborn 
existence are gradually undermining the rigidity of the territorial integrity principle and 
the doctrines and practices of international recognition policy.”75  
 Bartmann continues that federal questions have become increasingly important 
in contemporary politics and policy-making around the world. “Many new and old 
states are struggling to find appropriate structures to give expression to the ethnic, 
religious and linguistic diversity of various societies. During the Cold war years, the 
southeastern flank of NATO came to the edge of collapse because both Turkey and 
Greece, both NATO members, opposed each over the Cyprus problem. In the post-Cold 
War era the interests of the West and the United States can be negatively affected 
because the area continues to be geographically vital for Western needs due to Cyprus’s 
strategic location at the entrance to oil routes in the Middle East and Asia. So, a durable 
solution to the Cyprus problem is as necessary and vital for the Cypriots themselves as 
it is for Turkey, Greece and others.”76  
 Cyprus is located at the heart of the Eastern Mediterranean region. It has a 
strategic location in terms of maintaining security or, on the contrary, building up a 
security crisis in the region. All of the countries try to influence Cyprus, involving the 
issues such as expanding of Central Asian energy resources and trade routes to the 
Eastern Mediterranean via Turkey, the building of peace in the Middle East and the 
establishment of economic and commercial union in the region, the setting up of a free 
trade zone between the EU and regional countries, and transporting water from Turkey 
to the other countries in the area.77  
 After explaining the importance of Cyprus in the new international environment, 
the third party initiatives and/or pressures in the Cyprus case such as the United States, 
Great Britain, and the United Nations are observed in this paper. 
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 ii. Third Parties’ Initiatives/Pressures 
 
Great Britain: 
 The third guarantor country is Great Britain according to the 1960 Agreement. 
The main focus of Greek and Greek Cypriot pressure has been Britain, not only because 
of its historic connection with the island and its residual legal role, but because the 
presence of the basis in the South of Cyprus causes a particular vulnerability. It is 
always convenient to have bases where aircraft can land and where troops can be 
stationed. So Great Britain cannot isolate herself from the Cyprus problem. She acts 
with the international community, the UN, the EU, and the US.78  
 
The United States 
 The promotion of a just and lasting Cyprus settlement is a constant of U.S. 
foreign policy. The United States is the principal outside player that can help to bring 
about a settlement on Cyprus because the US has a credible relationship with all four 
sides, Turkey, Greece, Turkish, and Greek Cyprus. The U.S. backs the mandate given to 
the UN Secretary-General to facilitate negotiations between the Greek and Turkish 
Cypriot communities. In January 1995, reflecting the Administration’s interest in 
promoting a resolution of the Cyprus dispute, President Clinton appointed Richard 
Beattie to serve as his special Presidential Emissary for Cyprus. The overwhelming 
priority of the US Embassy in Nicosia is promoting a comprehensive settlement to 
resolve confrontation on Cyprus. A significant segment of the US population demands 
an active US role to help resolve the Cyprus problem. The United States continues 
vigorously to support and aid the UN Secretary-General’s efforts. In June 1997, the 
United States appointed Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke as Special Presidential 
Emissary for Cyprus.79 His aim was to assess the prospects for shuttle diplomacy in the 
region. The initiatives of Holbrooke gave its fruit and in June 1997, the UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan invited the parties to negotiations.  
 The United States diplomatic efforts in the UN-led proximity talks, which began 
in 1999, have been coordinated with the Assistant Secretary of State for European 
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Affairs and the Special Cyprus Coordinator in the State Department. 80 The US 
Embassy in Nicosia oversees $15 million in Congressionally earmarked Economic 
Support Funds (ESF) for activities that promote peace and cooperation between the 
island’s Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities.81 
  
The United Nations: 
 The Security Council first passed a resolution to send a peacekeeping force to 
Cyprus in 1964. As the mandate is only for six months with a new resolution to be 
passed each time, it would be possible to say that the Cyprus question has been 
discussed and resolutions passed twice a year for the last 38 years.82   
 The foremost principle for settling the Cyprus problem is the creation of a 
federal Cyprus state that recognizes the equal rights of both communities and is an 
independent state, undivided with one citizenship, one foreign policy and one 
administration. These principles have been repeated in all the resolutions. All 
resolutions mentioned that the present situation is unacceptable. Concern has been 
expressed at the cost and level of re-arming on the Greek Cypriot side but no proposals 
have been made on how to amend this. However, there have been repeated calls for the 
reduction of foreign troops (ie. the Turkish army) on the Turkish Cypriot side. The 
peacekeeping force’s mandate is renewed every six months.83  
 In 1997 the Security Council sent a goodwill mission to the two communities 
and arranged face-to-face meetings. In the same year the European Union’s “2000 
Agenda” was leaked to the press. The agenda mentions that discussions with Cyprus on 
membership would start in 1998. In response to this, Turkey, in a bilateral 
announcement with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, reiterated the ‘parallel 
union’ strategy and on 6th August 1997 signed an agreement for a joint commission. 
Again in 1999, the Security Council managed to start a new round of talks between the 
two communities. There were five rounds. On 8th November 2000, the Security Council 
proposed Kofi Annan’s “oral statements” in a note that returned to the principles of a 
Cypriot Federation. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, with Turkish support, 
pulled out of the talks. At the 2000 EU Helsinki Summit Turkey’s candidacy was 
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officially accepted. And those events bring the situation up to the President Denkdas’s 
proposals responded to with the direct meeting that started at the end of 2001.84 
 
iii. Changing Relations Between Turkey and Greece 
 
Turkey: 
 The Cyprus issue involves Turkey’s vital, national, and strategic interests. A 
great amount of commitment and sensitivity is attached to it both on the public and 
official level. Turkey’s primary consideration with respect to Cyprus, in line with the 
contractual obligations as a guarantor power, has been the preservation of peace and 
stability on the island in general and the protection of safety and well-being of the 
Turkish Cypriot people in particular.85 In 1960, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots set up on 
partnership state according to agreements signed by the Turkish Cypriot and Greek 
Cypriot leaders and the Turkish, Greek, and British governments. In 1963, the Greek 
Cypriots forcefully ousted the Turkish Cypriots from the new republic and identified 
themselves as the Government of Cyprus. Turkey has not recognized the Republic of 
Cyprus, mentioning that the Republic of Cyprus government by Greek Cypriots is 
illegal.86  
 Turkey supports the proposal of Rauf Denkdas on the establishment of the 
‘Cyprus Confederation’ according to the principles of equality. The proposal preserves 
the unity of the island with its confederal structure and presents a historic opportunity 
for a just and lasting settlement. In 1990, the Greek Cypriot side applied for the EU 
membership on behalf of the whole island. From the beginning of the application 
process, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots opposed this application. Both Turkey and the 
Turkish Cypriots considered this move as unlawful and illegitimate. They mentioned 
that the ground of the Greek Cypriots application was prepared without the consent of 
the Turkish side’s approval. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots maintained that the 
1959/1960 Agreements do not permit Cyprus to join international organizations and 
pacts of alliances in which both Turkey and Greece do not participate.87 
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 Turkey is committed to finding a negotiated solution to the problem. Turkey 
always mentions that efforts in this direction have the best chance of success if they are 
built on the realities in Cyprus. In this regard, recognition of the two equal and 
sovereign parties in Cyprus would be the starting point. Turkey is now a candidate for 
European Union membership. When Denkdash said “no” the last time, voices in Turkey 
proclaimed “enough”. Media, business leaders and for the first time, responsible 
politicians realized that the unresolved Cyprus problem stood in the way of Turkey’s 
larger strategic interests in moving toward the West. With Cyprus’ own accession to the 
EU expected in December, Denkdash and his supporters in Turkey were faced with a 
hard choice. Either they abandon hope for a political solution and all Cyprus to enter the 
EU, with the Turkish side left behind, or they come to an agreement with the Greek 
Cypriots before Cyprus slips away. With few cards to play, Denkdash reversed course, 
leading to the negotiations now under way.88 
 
Greece: 
 The adverse mutual perceptions of Greece and Turkey are made even sharper in 
the new dynamics of the post-Cold War environment. The Greeks believe that the 
introduction of Turkish troops in 1974 represented a well-planned invasion of Cyprus, a 
position backed by the numerous UN resolutions calling for the withdrawal of all 
foreign troops from the island. For Greeks, the most important aspect of any settlement 
is a total or at least substantial withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island. This action 
will help soothe Greece’s national pride and reduce fears of further Turkish territorial 
advances on the island.89  
 A solution based on UN resolutions for a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with 
one international personality, one citizenship and one sovereignty is the solution that 
Greece supports in the Cyprus problem. The Greeks view the Turkish military 
occupation as the shape of things to come in the Aegean as well. The fundamental 
Greek fear is that Turkey would attempt to undertake a strategy of partition in the 
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Aegean similar to what unfolded in Cyprus. The Greeks mention that without a Cyprus 
settlement, there can be no improvement in Greek-Turkish relations.90  
 
Relations between Greece and Turkey: Steps Towards Friendship 
 From the beginning of the 1990s, Turkey and Greece, two old adversaries, have 
encountered new experiences of disagreement and mutual suspicion. Turkey, for 
example, no longer shares a border with Soviet Republics controlled by Russia, which 
historically has been the major threat to Turkey’s security. Turkey has established close 
political and economic relationships with new countries in this region. Especially after 
the Gulf War, the strategic importance of the country was seen one more time. For 
Greece, the new opportunities for the advancement of Turkey’s foreign policies have 
been worrisome. Turkey was among the first countries to recognize and assist the newly 
independent Macedonia. Ankara also has strong relations with Albania, with whom 
Greece has had strained relations because of the Greek community in that country.91  
 Apart from these experiences, the Bosnian War has caused the greatest 
aggravation for Athens and Ankara. While Greece supported Serbia and helped 
Belgrade, Turkey provided diplomatic and covert military assistance to the Muslim-led 
Bosnian government.92  
 In June 1996, a crisis over an Aegean islet increased the already high tension 
between these two states. The help of the United States prevented an armed conflict. 
Other issues also cause additional aggravations: Turkey sees Greece as impeding its 
efforts to develop closer ties with the West, particularly on the issue of Turkey’s 
admission to the European candidacy. One of the most important crises was the 
announcement of Greece’s help to separatist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Ankara 
has claimed that a reported Greek-Syrian military cooperation agreement is aimed at 
Turkey. During the Ocalan crisis, the PKK crisis, however, relations between the two 
countries started to change, and the first steps for friendly relations have started.93  
 Simitis and Y. Papandreu are the two Greek political figures that have come to 
the scene during the Ocalan crisis. Yorgo Papandreu, Greek Foreign Minister, tried to 
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start dialogue with Turkey without taking the Greek public opinion into consideration. 
Simitis and Papandreu believe that they could bring a new phase in Turkish-Greek 
relations and for this aim, they have started friendly diplomatic relations.94  
 This optimism of Athens has also been met with pleasure in Ankara. Although 
the Ocalan crisis continued to be mentioned in the press, Greece’s peaceful attitudes 
caused a change in the Turkish press that started to focus on the development of 
Turkish-Greek relations. The friendship between Ismail Cem, Turkish Foreign Minister, 
and Yorgo Papandreu helped the Turkish-Greek rapprochement.95 
 The earthquake that destroyed the Marmara region on 17 August 1999 also 
facilitated the Turkish-Greek rapprochement. Greeks collected aid all over Greece, 
which was one of the first countries, that sent a rescue team to Turkey. The response to 
the earthquake showed that the Greek and Turkish people are tired of hostility. The first 
concrete evidence of Turkish-Greek friendship was seen in December 1999 in the 
Helsinki Summit when Turkey was chosen as a candidate to the European Union, and 
Greece did not veto that decision.96 
  
iv. The European Union Enlargement Process  
 In the 1990s, there has been no serious event nor bloodshed occurred in the 
island. However, a more important event took place in the international arena. In the 
early 1990s, the European Union got ready to further extend its borders into the Eastern 
Mediterranean. The close relationship established between Cyprus and the European 
Community with the signing of the 1987 customs union agreement encouraged the 
government of Cyprus to apply for full membership in the European Community in 
July.97 After three years, on 4 October 1993, the European Commission issued an 
opinion on Cyprus’s application and concluded that Cyprus was eligible to be part of 
the EU. The council also supported the commission’s proposal for close cooperation 
with the Cypriot government in order to facilitate the economic, social, and political 
transition aiming the integration of the island to the EU. In November 1993, talks 
                                                                                                                                                                          
93 B. Oran, “Turk Dis Politikasi: Kurtulus Savasindan Bugune Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar,” (İstanbul: 
İletisim Yayinlari, 2002), pp.472-480 
94 ibid, pp.472-480 
95 ibid, pp.475-479 
96 ibid, p. 478 
97 J. S. Joseph, S.(1996). “Cyprus at the Threshold of the European Union.” Mediterranean Quarterly,(7), 
2  
between the commission and the government of Cyprus started and continued until 
February 1995, when they were successfully completed.98  
 Between 1995-1997, several meetings took place. These meetings provided the 
opportunity for Cyprus officials to have a regular and in depth exchange of views and 
ideas with Union officials. The bilateral agreement for the participation of Cyprus as a 
full member in Community Programs Leonardo da Vinci, Socrates, and Youth for 
Europe were signed in July 1997. The way towards EU enlargement was facilitated by 
the issuing, on 15 July 1997, of AGENDA 2000, a Commission document, which is a 
study of the possible effects of enlargement on the EU and the applicant countries and 
contains proposals on the future development of the policies of the Union. With regard 
to Cyprus, the Commission reaffirmed its 1993 Opinion, noting Cyprus’ “advanced 
level of development and economic dynamism.”99  
 In December 2000, the 4th meeting of the EU-Cyprus Association Committee 
took place in Nicosia. The EU and Cyprus assessed the progress as regards the 
implementation of the Accession Partnership and the enhancement of Cyprus’ 
administrative capacity as well as its participation in Community Programs.100 
 The EU accession process is reaching its final stages, and it is expected that by 
December 2002, Cyprus will be one of the countries invited to join the Union at the 
Copenhagen Summit. The face-to-face negotiations in December 2001 between the two 
leaders of Cypriot communities and Cyprus’ EU accession are being conducted 
separately but at the same time are closely linked and interrelated. The Helsinki Summit 
in 1999, clearly stated: 
 ‘The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the 
accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the 
completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be made 
without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take into account of all 
relevant factors.’101 
 Greek Cyprus’ Clerides government has promoted EU accession for its political 
and security benefits more than its economic ones. The Greek Cypriots hope that EU 
pressure will be more effective than UN efforts in facilitating the re-unification of the 
island. The year 2002 presents an historic opportunity. An announcement is likely at the 
                                                          
98 ibid, pp. 112-122  
99 ibid, pp.112-122 
100 www.cyprus-eu.org.cy/eng/06-news/news084.htm 
101 www.cyprus-eu.org.cy/eng/06-news/news084.htm  
end of this year that Cyprus will be among a number of countries to join the European 
Union in 2004. But Turkey also aspires to EU membership in due course, and its 
chances will be much more improved if the Cyprus issue can be resolved. Conversely, if 
Cyprus joins the EU as a divided island, Turkey’s prospects of membership will be 
destroyed.102  To sum up, one can say that the European accession of Cyprus heavily 
affects the Turkish Cypriot leader’s decision to start negotiations in a positive way.   
 
3.3 Structural Factors 
 As previously stated, structural factors consist of the hurting stalemate, a 
determined deadline and the complete willingness of the conflicting parties.  
 
i. Hurting Stalemate 
 Ripe periods of time create opportunities for conflict resolution. In the essence, 
the cost of continued conflict in Cyprus has reached a sufficiently painful level 
especially for the Turkish Cypriots that the status quo could no longer be maintained.  
 Enduring rivalries are among the most dangerous and conflict-prone dyads in the 
international system. As a result, developing means to aid conflict management between 
long-term rivals, with their legacy of mutual distrust and pain, makes conflict resolution 
more difficult to achieve than other conflicts.  
 
Turkish Cypriot Side 
 Ergun Olgun, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Under-Secretary to the 
President of the Republic, mentioned in a speech that there is no situation where both 
the Turkish and Greek Cypriots are equally hurt from the existing status quo. He 
continues that the Greek Cypriots have all the economic and political advantages over 
the Turkish Cypriots, depriving the Turkish side from economic and political 
advantages thus benefiting from the status quo. So it cannot be said that there is a 
situation where there is equal political and economic hurt on the parties.103  
 Turkish Cypriots have been greatly too much because of economic conditions 
since 1983. The economic disparity between the two communities of Cyprus is obvious. 
Although the Turkish Cypriot area operates on a free-market basis, the lack of private 
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and governmental investment, shortages of skilled labor and experienced managers, 
plus inflation and the devaluation of the Turkish lira, which the Turkish Cypriots use as 
their currency, continue to plague the economy. A Greek-Cypriot-organized economic 
boycott of the Turkish Cypriot region also has negatively affected the Turkish Cypriot 
economy.104  
 After the European Union announced that Cyprus would be a European Union 
member at the end of 2002, the Turkish Cypriots recognized the importance of time. 
The economic hardship that the Turkish side has faced for years can come to an end 
with the accession to the EU. The Turkish side does not want to miss the big 
opportunity. They know that if they cannot find a solution, after the accession of the 
Greek side to the EU, they would be totally isolated.  
 Not only the Turkish Cypriots but also Turkey, which supports the Turkish 
Cypriots and declared that they would annex the northern part of the island if the Greek 
side is accepted to the EU as a member, sees that her own accession to the EU is in 
danger. Different voices in Turkey start to show themselves by emphasizing that the 
cost of not being a member of the EU would be too high to bear. Many Turkish people 
think that with the acceptance of Cyprus to the EU, Turkey’s chance will reduce 
because Greece also will have a partner that would veto Turkey’s entrance. So this time, 
Turkey is also willing to solve the problem. Therefore, one can conclude that hurting 
stalemate is positively affective in Denkdas’s decision to start negotiations. 
 
Greek Cypriot Side 
 One needs to also look the Greek Cypriots’ reason to accept the direct talks that 
Denkdas began. While standing at the gate of the EU, Greek Cypriot leader Clerides 
also has reasons to accept Denkdas’ invitation. If the Greek side wants to membership 
in the EU, it cannot show unwillingness to solve the Cyprus problem. They do not want 
to be seen as the party that does not want to negotiate. Although the European Union 
accepted Cyprus’ membership, there are still voices that are suspicious about taking a 
country that has political problems. They believe that accession of a divided island is 
not the optimal solution. With this political climate, Clerides accepted Denkdas’s 
invitation for direct talks.105   
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 ii. Deadline    
 In the Cyprus case the time constraint is the Cyprus’ EU accession. Both sides 
know that the chances for conflict resolution will not be the same after Cyprus’ 
membership. As noted both sides have different reasons to start direct negotiations 
within a limited time. However, two ,leaders have started to negotiate face-to-face since 
December 2001 to find a common solution. In conclusion, one can say that a 
determined deadline positively affected the Turkish Cypriots to start direct talks. 
 
iii. Complete Willingness 
 Complete willingness is another component of the structural factors. It is 
important to find out that if both sides are completely willing to solve the problem. In 
the Cyprus case, however, one cannot be sure about whether the sides really want to. 
Most people think that both the Turkish and the Greek sides started face-to-face 
negotiations for different reasons. Many people think that the Turkish leader Denkdas 
started direct negotiations in order to gain time before Cyprus becomes an EU member. 
The Turkish side thinks that after the EU accession, the Greek side will undermine 
Turkish Cypriots’ rights. The Greek side, fearing from a Turkish intervention, wants to 
gain time until their accession to the EU. They do not want to be seen as a cheater, who 
does not want to negotiate. All these different understandings are because of mutual 
distrust. No settlement will be reached without security arrangements with which both 
sides are comfortable and which, do not seem to pose a threat to the other community. 
Until trust is established between the sides, no one can talk about complete willingness. 
Unfortunately, the analysis of the evidence of complete willingness is not enough to 
determine the direction of the influence. So, I will not mention how complete 
willingness affected the decision of both conflicting parties.  
 The aim of this chapter was to explore the effect of the nine factors discussed 
here in the first chapter in the Cyprus case. Until now, these nine factors have been 
elaborated in order to find out the effective factors that led to December 2001 direct 
negotiations. This chapter analyzed factors that affected the leaders to start direct talks. 
The next chapter summarizes the findings and draws the conclusion.  
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
FINDINGS & CONCLUSION 
 
 The aim of this last chapter is to summarize the findings mentioned in the 
chapter three. The easiest way to understand the effects of these factors is to create a 
table that shows the factors and their effects.   
Factors Led To Direct Negotiations and Their Effects On Leaders’ Decision to Negotiation 
Effective Factors Greek 
Side 
Direction of 
Effect 
 Turkish 
Side 
Direction of 
Effect 
      
Change in domestic 
politics 
Yes Not 
applicable 
 Yes Positive 
Leadership change No Not 
applicable 
 No Not applicable
Increasing political 
opposition 
Yes Positive  Yes Positive 
Domestic pressure Yes Not 
Applicable 
 Yes Positive 
Change in international 
politics 
Yes Positive  Yes Positive 
3rd Party 
initiatives/pressures 
Yes Positive  Yes Positive 
Ripe Moment No Not 
Applicable 
 Yes Positive 
Deadline No Not 
Applicable 
 Yes Positive 
Complete Willingness No Not 
Applicable 
 No Not 
Applicable 
 
Chapter three explains the factors in detail. Some are effective and some not. 
The factors affecting the decision of the leaders negatively are the complete willingness 
and the ripe moment. Because of the mistrust between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, 
the sides may not have the complete willingness to solve the Cyprus problem. Also it is 
important to note that the two communities in Cyprus, and their motherlands, have 
completely different perceptions of the history of the island. ‘History’ ended in 1974 for 
the Turkish Cypriots and began then for Greek Cypriots. It is significant that the only 
mutual data the two communities share is 1960, and one of the aspects of the 1960 
settlement entailed a shared sovereignty.106 So complete willingness is a factor that 
affects the leaders and communities negatively. However, as stated in chapter three, 
concrete evidence does not supports this argument so it is not mentioned the direction of 
the effect in the table. 
 It is hard to talk about ripe moment in the case of Cyprus because of the unequal 
positions of the parties. Turkish Cypriots have experienced economic hardship since 
1983 because their economy depends on Turkish aid and the embargo does not allow 
aid or assistance from international organizations. Many Turkish Cypriots immigrate 
because of economic problems. This is not the case for Greek Cypriots who have their 
economic and political power. The living standard is higher in South Cyprus. Their 
situation will improve when the Greek Cypriots become members of the EU at the end 
of 2002. So, in the Cyprus case there is no mutually hurting stalemate. One side benefits 
from the status quo while the other side faces the difficulties. The cost of continuing the 
conflict is higher for the Turkish Cypriots than the Greek Cypriots. So it is for the 
advantage of the Turkish Cypriots to resolve the Cyprus conflict.  
 A deadline, like the ripe moment, is another factor effecting the decision for 
negotiation. In the Cyprus problem the deadline is the Cyprus’ EU accession. After the 
European Union announced that Cyprus would be a member of the Union with or 
without a resolution, Turkish Cypriots and the motherland Turkey have become alert. 
Turkish Cypriots do not want to be isolated from the benefits of the EU. They know that 
if Cyprus becomes a member of the EU, Turkish Cypriots will lose their chance for 
international recognition. They also will not benefit from the economic advantages that 
the EU provides. So the deadline positively affected Turkish President Denkdas’s 
decision of direct negotiations.   
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 Some factors do not affect each party such as change in leadership. In both 
communities there is no leadership change and in relation with this, there is no domestic 
policy change, also. However, there are some factors that influence the attitudes of the 
leaders. Clerides, the President of the Greek Cypriots, has decided to retire when his 
term ends. He wants to move a step forward before leaving the political arena. His 
career plans also cause a slight change in domestic politics On the other hand, President 
Denkdas, President of the Turkish side, has changed his domestic policies due to the 
pressure from Turkey, especially after Turkey’s candidacy status has been approved by 
the EU, Turkey has not behaved as aggressively as before. Also the rapprochement 
between Greece and Turkey in the last years prevents Turkey to act aggressively. These 
developments also affect Denkdas’s policies.  
 Domestic pressure, another factor in this thesis, is exemplified by the Turkish 
Cypriots’ fear that a settlement calling for a unified island will result in their domination 
by more numerous and wealthier Greek Cypriots. Greek Cypriots do not fear the 
Turkish Cypriots, whom they outnumber four to one, but do fear the continued presence 
of the Turkish military. There has been a growing sentiment among Greek Cypriots that 
the existing separation between the two communities is not such a bad idea after all. 
The South has enjoyed sustained economic growth and low levels of unemployment. By 
contrast, the Turkish Cypriots’ per capita income is about a fifth of what it is in the 
South. Since the beginning of 1990s, high unemployment and economic slowdown, 
along with high inflation rates, have posed a major challenge to the Turkish Cypriot 
leadership. These economic difficulties have been blamed for the emigration of many 
Turkish Cypriots.107  
 Especially for the last several years, the governments of both communities have 
faced the opposition parties’ pressures. President Denkdas’ main challengers have been 
from center-left parties like the Republican Turkish Party and the Communal Liberation 
Party, which have accused him of impeding the achievement of a fair settlement with 
the Greek Cypriot leadership. The Republican Turkish Party and the Communal 
Liberation Party have taken a more flexible stance on intercommunal issues than 
Denkdas. In the Greek Cypriot community the main party on the left, the Progressive 
Party of the Working People (AKEL) has been the most supportive of a settlement 
based on the various ideas put forth by the UN Secretary-General. The smaller socialist 
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party, the Unified Democratic Union of Cyprus (EDEK), has opposed to the creation of 
a federation that gives autonomy to the Turkish Cypriots. It has also opposed the 
continuation of Turkey’s status as a guarantor. The same position is held by the centrist 
Democratic Party (DEKO), which represents the political core of what has come to be 
known as the rejectionist front over the issue of a federal settlement. So the increasing 
pressures of the opposition parties of both communities have an impact on the 
beginning of the direct negotiations that help to find a solution to the problem.108  
 Change in international environment in turn effect third party attitudes. The 
Cyprus problem, an unresolved dispute, has become a threat to international peace and 
security. The International community puts its full weight behind the solution. The 
Cyprus Problem has been a major source of instability in the Eastern Mediterranean and 
an important obstacle to reconciliation between Greece and Turkey. In order to achieve 
stability in the region, the Cyprus Conflict should be resolved. Third party initiatives 
explained in detail in the third chapter reveal that the most effective third party pressure 
is the EU’ s involvement. The European Union’s decision to take Cyprus to the Union 
at the end of 2002 is the most effective third party pressure especially for Turkish 
Cypriots. When these nine factors are taken into consideration according to their 
effectiveness that lead to direct negotiations, the EU seems to be the most effective one. 
The arguments of the political opposition parties, increasing domestic pressure, a 
determined deadline, and ripe moment for the Turkish Cypriots are all connected to the 
Cyprus’ accession to the EU. In the light of the facts, the EU membership is the most 
important factor that effects the Denkdas’ behaviour of accepting the face-to-face 
negotiations. He recognizes that the Turkish Cypriots have not so much time. Before 
losing what they have, they should try to find a solution.  
 After examining all the factors, one can conclude that four factors affected both 
conflicting parties' decisions to start negotiations: change in domestic politics, 
increasing political opposition, change in international politics and third parties’ 
initiatives/pressures. Seven factors which affected the Turkish side’s decision to start 
negotiations are: change in domestic politics, increasing political opposition, domestic 
pressure, change in international environment, third parties initiatives or pressures, 
hurting stalemate, and deadline. From this analysis, one can conclude that the Turkish 
Cypriots have more reasons to start direct talks than do the Greek Cypriots. When the 
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analysis of the factors that affected the Turkish Cypriots is examined, one can see that 
the European Union accession is the most effective factor because all seven factors are 
somehow related to the EU. Denkdas’s initiative of direct negotiations is thus not a big 
surprise when the domestic, international and structural factors are analyzed because it 
is the Turkish Cypriot side that has been effected from the changing situation after 
1997.  
 I hope this thesis opens the way for more research on the pre-negotiation phase. 
There have been many ethnic division conflicts in the world. Many people have written 
about the negotiation or post-negotiation processes. Most of these works are about the 
successes or failures of negotiations. I believe that there should be more attention on the 
pre-negotiation phase, which is one of the main stones of the negotiation process. In this 
project I review the getting to the table literature. After combining the factors that are 
mentioned by different scholars, a framework exists that combines different variables 
that affect the getting to the table process. The theoretical contribution of this thesis to 
the field of conflict resolution is the framework mentioned in chapter one. Using that 
framework facilitates analyzing other conflicts.  
 This thesis can also have some policy implications. The Cyprus conflict is one 
of the ethnic conflicts that spread all over the world in the 1990s. In many different 
places, people have suffered from ethnic conflicts. Different third parties have tried to 
get the conflicting parties together to solve the conflicts, however, in most cases they 
have failed. The last direct talks, initiated by the Cypriot leaders, can be an example for 
other conflicts. The factors that affect the Cypriot leaders’ decision to negotiate can be 
applied to the other conflicts. Since some factors are clearly more effective than others, 
third parties can use similar methods to convince other conflicting parties to negotiate. 
 In conclusion this thesis can be used both in theoretical and practical areas 
although it has limited application areas because it is a master thesis, however, I believe 
that the ideas presented here should take its place in the conflict resolution field.  
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